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Abstract.
This paper analyzes the generally muted international response to the protracted plight of the
Rohingya, a persecuted Muslim minority in Myanmar, from the perspective of sociology of law. The
first part provides background on the Rohingya crisis and discusses relevant international legal
frameworks relating to crimes against humanity and genocide. The second part adapts analytical
frameworks developed by Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat on the emergence and transformation of
disputes, in order to examine some of the factors that frustrate the processes of naming crimes,
blaming perpetrators, and claiming rights and protection for the Rohingya minority in the
international context. Work by Bumiller and Edelman concerning models of legal protection, legal
ambiguity, and the mediating effects of symbolic structures of compliance augment the analysis.
Ambiguity as to when to apply the terms crimes against humanity or genocide, and the legal and
political implications that flow from naming such crimes, feed reluctance to act on the part of states.
Related factors constraining effective responses include a lack of a clear, streamlined process for
naming crimes, along with weak preventive norms mandating action in the absence of legal certainty.
As a result of these conditions, authority diffuses as to which institutions or actors have the power
and obligation to name crimes and determine appropriate responses. Competing political and
economic considerations obfuscate states’ willingness to engage the issue, and certain organizations
and bodies have limited capacity to enforce their prevention and protection mandates or to submit
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them to external scrutiny. Together, these factors combine to portray a weak institutionalization of
remedies, which Miller and Sarat have recognized serves to minimize disputing and limit the
probability of success. This sociological approach thus helps to clarify fundamental constraints on
and distinguishing characteristics of the international legal system in responding to atrocities.
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This paper analyzes the generally muted international response to the protracted plight of the 
Rohingya, a persecuted Muslim minority in Myanmar, from a sociology of law perspective. In 
recent years, some human rights experts and scholars have suggested that the legal terms “crimes 
against humanity” and “genocide” are applicable to the situation of this minority group. Under 
international law and practice, such claims implicate obligations to act on the part of the government 
of Myanmar and the international community. Yet international action on mitigating the risk of 
crimes against humanity and genocide has arguably been limited. 
To help explain this limited international response, this paper draws from and adapts the 
now classic sociological framework developed by Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat on the emergence 
and transformation of legal disputes. Following a background section on the Rohingya crisis and 
relevant international legal frameworks, this paper examines some of the factors that frustrate 
the processes of naming crimes, blaming perpetrators, and claiming rights and protection for the 
Rohingya minority in the international context. Work by Bumiller and Edelman concerning models 
of legal protection, legal ambiguity, and the mediating effects of symbolic structures of compliance 
augment the analysis. Ambiguity as to when to apply the terms crimes against humanity or 
genocide, the terms’ interrelationship, and the legal and political implications that flow from 
naming such crimes, feed reluctance to act on the part of other states. A lack of a clear adjudication 
process further complicates naming, as authority diffuses to a range of institutions or actors who 
have variable power to name the crimes and determine appropriate actions in response. Competing 
political and economic considerations obfuscate states’ willingness to engage the issue, and certain 
organizations and bodies are given mandates with limited capacity to enforce those mandates or to 
submit them to external scrutiny. 
Together, these factors combine to portray a weak institutionalization of remedies, a condition 
which Miller and Sarat have recognized serves to minimize disputing and limit the probability 
of success. This weak institutionalization of remedies reflects a legal culture in international 
institutions that is constrained with respect to enforcement. Institutions depend significantly on 
political will and social consensus. While normative commitments are often invoked, action is 
subject to the diffusion of responsibility in the naming, blaming, and claiming stages to a range 
of variously coordinated and politically motivated actors and institutions. This sociological 
approach thus helps to clarify fundamental constraints on the international legal system in 
responding to mass violence. It in turn identifies bottlenecks and areas for potential reform, 
and raises questions as to the uses and limits of law in improving prevention of and protection 
against mass atrocities.  
Background 
The Rohingya Crisis
The Rohingya are a Muslim minority in Myanmar that have primarily lived in Rakhine State 
bordering Bangladesh in western Myanmar for at least 200 years.1 The Myanmar government and 
others in the country refer to them as “illegal migrants” or “Bengalis,” invoking the nineteenth 
century migration of laborers and merchants from India under British colonial rule. The Rohingya 
1 Martin Smith, “The Muslim Rohingya of Burma,” (presentation, Conference of Burma Centrum Nederland, 
December 11, 1995), n.b. draft only for consultation, accessed December 15, 2017, http://www.netipr.org/policy/
downloads/19951211-Rohingyas-of-Burma-by-Martin-Smith.pdf. Martin claims that while no conclusive studies exist 
regarding how Rohingya culture arose, what “is absolutely clear is that in Muslim-majority townships of Maungdaw, 
Buthidaung and Rathedaung in northernmost Arakan [Rakhine State] a distinctive but local Muslim culture has 
developed over the past two hundred years in which the inhabitants speak a distinctive local dialect which mixes 
Bengali, Burmese, Hindi and English.” The background narrative provided here draws in part from Katherine 
Southwick, “Preventing Mass Atrocities against the Stateless Rohingya in Myanmar: A Call for Solutions,” Columbia 
Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2015), 139-142.
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were effectively stripped of citizenship under a law enacted in 1982, and for decades, they have 
suffered discrimination, forced labor, and campaigns of violence largely inflicted by government 
security forces and ethnic Rakhine Buddhists.2  
Violence among radical Buddhists in Rakhine State and Rohingya Muslims flared in 2012 
and 2013, resulting in over 200 deaths and around 170,000 persons internally displaced. Religious 
nationalist movements led by Buddhist monks enflamed tensions through hate speech against 
Muslim minorities.3 Many displaced Rohingya were confined to camps and villages where they 
were required to obtain a permit to leave or seek health care. In July 2012, a United Nations 
nutrition assessment found that 
2,000 children in camps were at a high risk of mortality. A further 9,000 children needed 
supplementary feeding of some kind, and 2,500 were at risk of acute malnutrition if their 
needs were not met. Three months later, 2,900 children were estimated to be at a high risk 
of death, and 14,000 children aged 6 months to 59 months needed supplementary feeding.4
Nearly two years later, in February 2014, the government banned Doctors Without Borders, 
the primary health care provider for the region’s one million Rohingya. The organization was 
forced to leave after assisting victims of a violent assault on a Rohingya village.5 A couple weeks 
later, radical Buddhists, claiming that humanitarian assistance organizations disproportionately 
favored the Rohingya, raided Red Cross and United Nations aid agencies, forcing over 300 foreign 
aid workers to evacuate. Some aid workers believed they had been expelled “so there are fewer 
witnesses to rampant mistreatment and occasional bloodletting.”6 Without outside assistance, 
speculation mounted that deaths in the displacement camps in particular had sharply increased.7 
Also in early 2014, the Myanmar government carried out its first census in three decades. 
Rohingya who wished to be counted were required to register as “Bengalis.” In October 2014, 
the government released its Rakhine State Action Plan, again insisting that Rohingya could 
apply for citizenship so long as they registered as Bengalis. Those who “refuse to be registered 
and without adequate documents” would be placed in camps.8 Most observers believed this Plan 
would “entrench discriminatory policies that deprive Rohingya Muslims in Burma of citizenship 
and lead to forced resettlement.”9 Meanwhile, thousands of Rohingya continued attempting to flee 
the country every year, often on rickety boats bound for Thailand or Malaysia. Some boats were 
pushed back to sea and at least hundreds of persons have drowned on the dangerous journeys, 
2 Union of Burma, Citizenship Law, Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4, 1982.
3 Thomas Fuller, “Extremism Rises Among Myanmar Buddhists,” New York Times, June 20, 2013, accessed November 15, 
2018, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/world/asia/extremism-rises-among-myanmar-buddhists-wary-of-muslim-
minority.html. Fuller cites anti-Muslim pamphlets distributed by radical monks stating that “Myanmar is facing a 
most dangerous and fearful poison that is severe enough to eradicate all civilization” and noting that even moderates 
state they “are afraid of Muslims because their population is increasing so rapidly.”
4 Sarnata Reynolds, “Myanmar Can Keep Rohingya from Starving, but Will It?” CNN World Global Public Square Blog, 
December 7, 2012, accessed November 15, 2018, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/07/myanmar-can-
keep-rohingya-from-starving-but-will-it/. 
5 Jane Perlez, “Death Stalks Muslims as Myanmar Cuts Off Aid,” New York Times, May 2, 2014, accessed November 15, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/03/world/asia/death-stalks-muslims-as-myanmar-cuts-off-aid.html. 
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. Perlez recounts a case where a baby girl died because the only clinics available to Rohingya either had no medical 
supplies or were closed and obtaining approval for a permit to visit a local hospital would have taken too long, if it 
would have been received at all. 
8 Jared Ferrie, “US Says Myanmar Should Draft New Plan to Give Rohingya Citizenship,” Reuters, November 13, 2014, 
accessed November 15, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/u-s-says-myanmar-should-
draft-new-plan-to-give-rohingya-citizenship-idUSKCN0IX0LE20141113. Ferrie also reports that the U.S. has “urged 
Myanmar to draft a new plan to allow the ethnic Rohingya minority to become citizens and to scrap proposed plans 
to send them to detention camps.”  
9 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Government Plan Would Segregate Rohingya,” October 3, 2014, accessed November 15, 
2018, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/burma-government-plan-would-segregate-rohingya. 
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while those Rohingya that reached land are sometimes held in crowded detention centers.10  
The latest round of violence against the Rohingya was sparked on August 25, 2017, when the 
militant group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked 30 police posts and an army 
base in Rakhine State. ARSA first appeared in late 2016, when its October 9, 2016 attack on three 
border posts left nine security officers dead and provoked a counteroffensive that displaced around 
100,000 people. Since the latest August 2017 attack and military counteroffensive, more than 730,000 
Rohingya have fled the country and crossed into Bangladesh,11 joining more than 200,000 Rohingya 
who previously fled over the past three decades.12 An estimated 30,000 non-Muslim civilians were 
internally displaced within two weeks of the attack.13 Roughly half a million Rohingya are thought 
to remain in Myanmar, largely cut off from humanitarian assistance.14 Human rights organizations 
have documented the burning of Rohingya villages across three townships in Rakhine State.15 
Many Rohingya have shared testimony of atrocities perpetrated by the Myanmar military and 
Rakhine Buddhist groups, including gang rapes and indiscriminate murder of men, women, and 
children.16 Throughout their time in Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees have had almost no access to 
jobs, services, or citizenship.17
The last few years of persecution of and violence against the Rohingya have transpired 
in the context of significant national reform. After almost half a century of authoritarianism, 
the government ostensibly began a democratic transition in 2011. It allowed for parliamentary 
elections, released political prisoners including Nobel Laureate and political opposition leader 
Aung San Suu Kyi, and restored some civil and political rights. The government also took steps to 
end armed conflict with some of the country’s largest ethnic groups. In April 2013, the European 
Union expressed its validation of these reforms when it lifted nearly all of its economic and 
individual sanctions against Myanmar. It kept in place an arms embargo, pending improvements 
in the treatment of minority Muslims.18 In October 2016, the U.S. also lifted most sanctions in order 
“to support efforts by the civilian government and the people of Burma to continue their process of 
political reform and broad-based economic growth and prosperity.”19 Foreign aid and investment, 
largely from within Asia, dramatically increased, and was valued at almost USD2 billion in 2013.20 
10 IRIN, “Analysis: In Search of a Regional Rohingya Solution,” July 26, 2013, accessed November 15, 2018, http://www.
irinnews.org/report/98477/analysis-in-search-of-a-regional-rohingya-solution. 
11 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Operational Update: Bangladesh,” October 16-31, 
2018, accessed November 19, 2018, http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Bangladesh%20-%20
Operational%20Update%20-%2016-31OCT18.pdf. 
12  International Organization of Migration, “IOM Bangladesh: Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Response External Report,” 
October 19-25, 2018, accessed November 18, 2018, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/
bangladesh_sr_20181019-25.pdf. 
13 Andrew R.C. Marshall and Krishna Das, “Rohingya Insurgents Declare Temporary Ceasefire Amid Humanitarian 
Crisis,” Reuters, September 9, 2017, accessed November 19, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-
rohingya/rohingya-insurgents-declare-temporary-ceasefire-amid-humanitarian-crisis-idUSKCN1BK07T. 
14 Max Bearak, “Bangladesh Is Now Home to Almost 1 Million Rohingya Refugees,” Washington Post, October 25, 2017, 
accessed November 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/25/bangladesh-is-now-
home-to-almost-1-million-rohingya-refugees/?utm_term=.db5f3fef4e8f. 
15 Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Satellite Imagery Shows Mass Destruction,” September 19, 2017, accessed November 15, 
2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/19/burma-satellite-imagery-shows-mass-destruction. 
16 Rachael Revesz, “Doctors Report Horrifying Gang Rape Attacks on Rohingya Women,” The Independent, September 25, 
2017, accessed November 15, 2018, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/doctors-un-rohingya-muslim-
women-refugees-burma-rape-sexual-violence-a7965251.html; Jeffrey Gettleman, “Rohingya Recount Atrocities: They 
Threw My Baby Into a Fire,” New York Times, October 11, 2017, accessed November 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/10/11/world/asia/rohingya-myanmar-atrocities.html?r=0. 
17 Sean Garcia and Camilla Olson, Rohingya: Burma’s Forgotten Minority (Refugees International, December 18, 2008), 
accessed November 18, 2017, http://www.refworld.org/docid/494f53e72.html. 
18 Fergal Keane, “EU Lifts Sanctions against Burma,” BBC News Europe, April 22, 2013, accessed November 15, 2018, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22254493. 
19 U.S. Embassy in Burma, “U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs: Treasury Implements Termination of 
Burma Sanctions Program,” October 7, 2016, accessed November 18, 2018, https://mm.usembassy.gov/termination-
burma-sanctions-program/. 
20 Aung Hla Tun and Jared Ferrie, “Foreign Investment in Myanmar Surges, Office Rents Sizzle,” Reuters, September 
Southwick
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1572
122
Investment from American and European companies has grown increasingly uncertain, however, 
partly as a result of large-scale violence in Rakhine and the increased willingness of the US and the 
EU to reimpose sanctions against military leaders.21  
In November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy, 
won a landslide victory in the country’s first openly contested parliamentary elections in 25 years. 
Under the 2008 Constitution, a quarter of seats in Parliament are held by the military, enabling it 
to veto constitutional amendments. Because Aung San Suu Kyi has immediate family with non-
Burmese citizenship – her sons are British citizens – she could not become president, though she 
has operated as the government’s de facto leader under the title of State Counselor. The military, 
which operates independently of the civilian government, retains control over the ministries of 
defense, border, and home affairs. 
The post-August 2017 round of violence against the Rohingya, which is said to have caused 
the largest and fastest exodus of people since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, has attracted more 
international attention than past instances of persecution and displacement.22 On September 
11, 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights called this latest campaign 
a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”23 In October 2017, the United States government 
suspended military assistance to Myanmar units linked to violence against the Rohingya.24 The 
United Kingdom and European Union similarly reduced military relations with Myanmar at this 
time.25 Then U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson declared that the international community could 
not “be witness to the atrocities that have been reported.”26 A U.S. State Department spokesperson 
stated that, “It is imperative that any individuals or entities responsible for atrocities, including 
non-state actors and vigilantes, be held accountable.”27 Also in October 2017, U.S. Senator Ben 
Cardin of Maryland characterized the Myanmar government’s response as genocide.28 Together 
with the late U.S. Senator John McCain, Senator Cardin proposed legislation to impose sanctions 
and travel restrictions on senior Myanmar military officials deemed to be responsible for atrocities.29 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the legislation in February 2018 for consideration 
by the whole Senate. According to a December 2017 report, “Doctors Without Borders has called 
the camps in Bangladesh a ‘time bomb ticking toward a full-blown health crisis’ as sanitation and 
medical services and distribution of clean water have struggled to keep up with refugee arrivals.”30 
20, 2013, accessed November 20, 2018, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/myanmar-investment-
idUSL3N0HG0L420130920. 
21 Yigal Chazan, “Foreign Investors Jittery Amid Myanmar’s Rohingya Crisis,” The Diplomat, October 21, 2017, accessed 
November 18, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/foreign-investors-jittery-amid-myanmars-rohingya-crisis/. 
22 “The Rohingya Refugee Crisis Is the Worst in Decades,” The Economist, September 21, 2017, accessed November 18, 
2018, https://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/09/daily-chart-13. 
23 Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, “Darker and More Dangerous: High Commissioner Updates the Human Rights Council 
on Human Rights Issues in 40 Countries,” (opening statement, Geneva, September 11, 2017), United Nations 
Human Rights Council, accessed November 15, 2018, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=22041&LangID=E. 
24 “US Withdraws Assistance from Myanmar Military Amid Rohingya Crisis,” The Guardian, October 24, 2017, accessed 
November 18, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/24/us-withdraws-assistance-from-myanmar-
military-amid-rohingya-crisis. 
25 “EU to Scale Back Relations with Myanmar’s Military,” Financial Times, October 16, 2017, accessed November 18, 2018, 
https://www.ft.com/content/cf0b94f6-b25d-11e7-a398-73d59db9e399. 
26 “U.S. Says Hold Myanmar Military Leaders Accountable in Rohingya Crisis,” Reuters, October 18, 2017, accessed 
November 18, 2018, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-tillerson/u-s-says-holds-myanmar-
military-leaders-accountable-in-rohingya-crisis-idUSKBN1CN289. 
27 Ibid.
28 United States Senator Ben Cardin, “Cardin Labels Burmese Rohingya Crisis ‘Genocide,’ Presses Administration 
for Answers,” (press statement, October 24, 2017), accessed December 15, 2017, https://www.cardin.senate.gov/
newsroom/press/release/cardin-labels-burmese-rohingya-crisis-genocide-presses-administration-for-answers. 
29 United States Senator Ben Cardin, “Cardin, McCain Bill on Burma Accountability Passes Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee,” (press release, February 7, 2018), accessed November 16, 2018, https://www.cardin.senate.gov/
newsroom/press/release/cardin-mccain-bill-on-burma-accountability-passes-senate-foreign-relations-committee. 
30 Bearak, Bangladesh Is Now Home.
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In December 2017, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on General Maung Maung Soe, 
who oversaw the military crackdown against the Rohingya minority.31 In June 2018, Canada and 
the European Union sanctioned seven senior military leaders. 32 The U.S. sanctioned four more 
commanders and two military units in August 2018. 33 This decision almost coincided with the 
September 2018 release of a U.S. State Department report documenting widespread, systematic 
attacks and atrocities committed largely by the Myanmar military in the past two years. The 
report was based on an April 2018 survey of more than 1,000 Rohingya refugees living in camps 
in Bangladesh.34 Around the same time, an international independent fact-finding mission on 
Myanmar established by the United Nations Human Rights Council released its own report. 
Among its recommendations was a call for the United Nations to refer the situation of the 
Rohingya, as well as violence in Shan and Kachin States, to the International Criminal Court or 
other ad hoc international criminal tribunal. The report called for investigation and prosecution of 
senior military officials for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.35 The fact-finding 
mission’s detailed findings were published in a separate 444-page report.36 On September 6, 2018, 
in response to a request from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to clarify the 
court’s scope of jurisdiction, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ruled that it could exercise jurisdiction with 
regard to crimes within its jurisdiction, such as deportation and other crimes against humanity, 
provided that they were committed on the territory of a State that is party to the Rome Statute, such 
as Bangladesh.37 The ruling prompted the Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda to begin investigating 
whether evidence is sufficient to file charges against alleged perpetrators.38 
International Legal Frameworks: Crimes against Humanity and Genocide
Over the years and regarding the more recent attacks, various entities have applied the legal labels 
of crimes against humanity and genocide to the situation of the Rohingya. Scholars and human 
rights organizations, such as the Irish Centre for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, have 
characterized the plight of the Rohingya as crimes against humanity.39 Under the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, of which 122 countries (excluding Myanmar) are States Parties, 
a “crime against humanity” means any of the enumerated acts in Article 7(1) “when committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
31 Susan Heavey and Arshad Muhammad, “U.S. Sanctions Myanmar General Accused of Carrying Out Ethnic Cleansing 
Campaign Against Rohingya,” Time, December 22, 2017, accessed November 16, 2018, http://time.com/5077015/us-
sanctions-rights-abusers-myanmar-general/. 
32 Conor Finegan, “When Europe, Canada Slapped New Sanctions on Myanmar over Rohingya Treatment, Where Was 
US?” ABC News, July 8, 2018, accessed November 16, 2018, https://abcnews.go.com/International/europe-canada-
slapped-sanctions-myanmar-rohingya-treatment-us/story?id=56441577. 
33 United States Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Treasury Sanctions Commanders of the Burmese Security 
Forces for Serious Human Rights Abuses,” August 17, 2018, accessed November 16, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases/sm460. 
34 United States Department of State, Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State, August 2018, accessed November 
16, 2018, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/286307.pdf. 
35 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, September 12, 2018, 
(UN Doc. A/HRC/39/64), paras. 87-89, 105, accessed November 16, 2018, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/G18/274/54/PDF/G1827454.pdf?OpenElement. 
36 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on Myanmar, September 17, 2018 (UN Doc. A/HRC/39/CRP.2), accessed November 16, 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_CRP.2.pdf. 
37 Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 
September 6, 2018, No. ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, paras. 73-74.
38 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, “Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, on 
opening a Preliminary Examination concerning the alleged deportation of the Rohingya people from Myanmar to 
Bangladesh,” (statement, The Hague, September 18, 2018), accessed November 16, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/
Pages/item.aspx?name=180918-otp-stat-Rohingya. 
39 Irish Centre for Human Rights, Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma: The Situation of the Rohingyas (Galway: NUI 
Galway, 2010); Human Rights Watch, All You Can Do is Pray: Crimes against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of Rohingya 
Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State (HRW, 2013).
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of the attack.”40 Some of the acts include murder, forcible transfer of population, torture, rape, 
persecution, or other inhumane acts causing serious bodily or mental harm.41 On the application of 
crimes against humanity to the situation of the Rohingya, experts have shared a general consensus 
for several years.
Within the last few years, a growing number of experts and organizations also asserted that 
the Rohingya community faced a high risk of genocide or that genocide was and continues to be 
already under way.42 In addition to killing and causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group, among the acts that can constitute genocide under Article 2 of the 1948 Convention 
is “[d]eliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about [the group’s] 
physical destruction in whole or in part.”43 Such conditions could include, but are not limited to, 
“subjecting the group to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and denial of medical 
services. Also included is the creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as 
lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive work or physical exertion.”44 As the 
International Court of Justice has elaborated, a key feature of the crime of genocide is the intent 
requirement, that the acts are committed not only deliberately and unlawfully, but with “intent to 
destroy” a racial or religious group, “as such.” This requirement is also referred to as a “specific 
intent” to destroy a protected group.45 Proving genocidal intent carries a high burden of proof, as 
“claims against a State involving charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that 
is fully conclusive.”46 
Reviewing the elements of this crime suggests that the possibility of genocide could be 
seriously considered to describe the plight of the Rohingya over the past several years.47 The attacks 
on Rohingya villages, mass arrests and murder of men and boys, allegations of gang rape, travel 
restrictions, denationalization and denial of the group’s cultural identity, deprivation of access to 
health care and food, particularly high starvation rates among small children, hate speech, and 
mass displacement could plausibly constitute a cluster of facts from which genocidal intent could 
be inferred.48 In identifying genocidal intent, the UN’s August 2018 fact-finding mission report 
highlighted “the broader oppressive context and hate rhetoric; specific utterances of commanders 
and direct perpetrators; exclusionary policies, including to alter the demographic composition of 
Rakhine State; the level of organization indicating a plan for destruction; and the scale and brutality 
of the violence committed.”49 
40 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, (UN Doc. A/
CONF.183/9), article 7, accessed December 6, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf. 
41 Ibid., art. 7(1).
42 Maung Zarni and Alice Cowley, “The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy 
Journal 23, no. 3 (June 2014), 683; Geoffrey Nice and Francis Wade, “Preventing the Next Genocide,” Foreign Policy, 
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Yet even in 2013, before this latest round of mass violence, genocide scholar William Schabas 
said, “We’re moving into a zone where the word can be used in the case of the Rohingya. When 
you see measures preventing births, trying to deny the identity of a people, hoping to see that they 
. . . no longer exist . . . these are all warning signs that mean it’s not frivolous to envisage the use of 
the term genocide.”50 The Canada-based Sentinel Project for Genocide Prevention asserted in 2013 
that interethnic violence in Rakhine State “is part of a state-sponsored campaign of ethnic cleansing 
with the distinct possibility of genocide carried out either through extermination by killing squads 
or more slowly by isolation and starvation.”51 In 2014, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Early Warning 
Project identified Myanmar as the country at greatest risk of state-led mass killing.52 In 2015, Yale 
Law School’s human rights clinic determined that there was “strong evidence” of genocide against 
the Rohingya population of Myanmar.53 The same year, the International State Crime Initiative 
(ISCI) of Queen Mary University of London published a report, Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide 
in Myanmar, which concluded according to social scientific frameworks that genocide was taking 
place against the Rohingya.54 According to Dr. Penny Green of ISCI, the violence following the 
August 2017 attacks by Rohingya militants on Myanmar border posts pointed to a “disturbing 
yet entirely predictable escalation in the genocidal process.”55 In November 2017, Fortify Rights 
and the Simon Skojt Center at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum released a report expressing 
serious concern about “growing evidence of genocide against Rohingya Muslims.”56 While they 
found that further investigation would be necessary in order to ascertain genocidal intent, they 
emphasized that the Myanmar government and the international community “should not wait 
for a formal legal determination of genocide to take immediate action.”57 Fortify Rights released 
a lengthy report in July 2018 documenting “extensive and systematic preparations” on the part of 
Myanmar authorities to carry out atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and genocide in 
the weeks and months prior to the August 25, 2017 attacks by a Rohingya militant group.58 
Up until late 2017, neither foreign governments nor the United Nations had officially used 
the term, “genocide,” in connection with the Rohingya. In April 2014, speaking in his personal 
capacity, the then former UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Tomás Ojéa Quintana, said 
at a conference: “There are elements of genocide in Rakhine with respect to Rohingyas . . . The 
possibility of genocide needs to be discussed. I myself do not use the term genocide for strategic 
reasons.”59 In 2014, in a public letter to then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, 72 Members of 
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the U.S. Congress expressed deep concern about “horrific images of emaciated children . . . from 
Rakhine State in western Burma, where [violently displaced Rohingya] have been confined in what 
some are calling concentration camps.”60 Based on these and other human rights concerns, they 
requested the Secretary to “undertake a significant recalibration of U.S. policy” toward Myanmar.61 
Official references to genocide begin to appear in the autumn of 2017, after the scale of killings 
and mass displacement had reached the highest levels in the recent history of Rakhine State. In 
September 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron asserted that attacks against Rohingya 
constituted genocide.62 In December, at a special session of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, asked with respect to Myanmar, 
“Can anyone, can anyone, rule out that elements of genocide may be present?”63 As noted, U.S. 
Senator Cardin referred to the crisis in October 2017 as genocide, prompting the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress to craft legislation imposing sanctions on top Myanmar 
military leaders. At the same time, the U.S Secretary of State reportedly weighed whether to refer 
to events as “ethnic cleansing,” which is not a legal term of art, but which would signal a political 
willingness to take more action regarding the crisis.64  The same question arose with respect to the 
August 2018 U.S. State Department report, which media outlets cited as having “stopped short” of 
calling the violence genocide or crimes against humanity.65 Apparently, whether or not to use these 
terms was intensely debated internally, delaying the report’s release.66 Notwithstanding the labels’ 
absence, U.S. officials said that the report could justify punitive actions such as further sanctions 
against Myanmar leaders.67 Following the report’s release, the U.S. also doubled its humanitarian 
aid for the crisis, pledging an additional US$185 million to assist Rohingya in Bangladesh and 
Myanmar.68 
Crimes against humanity and genocide ostensibly trigger legal obligations on the part of 
the international community to act to protect threatened communities. Under the principle 
of Responsibility to Protect, when a state fails to protect its populations from these crimes, the 
international community must be “prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter [of the United Nations].”69 
Under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, parties 
“undertake to prevent and punish” genocide. Perpetrators “shall be tried by a competent tribunal”70 
and “shall be punished.”71 Furthermore, “Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs 
of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider 
60 Congress of the United States, Letter from Various U.S. Members of Congress to U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, July 31, 
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appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”72  The ICC’s Rome Statute 
affirms that these crimes are “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole.” Additionally, they “must not go unpunished and [] their effective prosecution must 
be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.”73 
The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crimes of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide on the basis of a referral of a plausible case to the Prosecutor from a State Party or the 
Security Council, or if the Prosecutor initiates an investigation.74 While Myanmar is not a State 
Party to the Rome Statute, it may accept jurisdiction in individual cases.75 
The UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the UN Special Adviser on the 
Responsibility to Protect have complementary mandates to “alert relevant actors to the risk of 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, enhancing the capacity 
of the United Nations to prevent these crimes . . . and engage with Member States, regional [] 
arrangements, and civil society to develop more effective means of response when they do 
occur.”76 Public statements from these offices on the Rohingya and Muslim minorities have been 
scarce in the past few years. A March 2013 statement by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide raised concerns about the spread of sectarian violence following anti-Muslim violence 
in Meiktila.77 In September 2017, the same official stated that violence against the Rohingya “could 
be ethnic cleansing and could amount to crimes against humanity.”78 Further, “In fact it can be the 
precursor to all the egregious crimes – and I mean genocide. We are not yet there, we cannot say 
we are facing a genocide, but it is time to take action.”79 During a week-long visit to the refugee 
camps in Bangladesh in March 2018, the Special Representative asserted that international crimes 
had been committed, but that it would be up to a court to make a final determination as to whether 
the atrocities constituted genocide.80   
Naming, Blaming, and Claiming Genocide
Despite the existence of relevant laws and legal obligations to act, steps to address the protracted 
and worsening plight of the Rohingya have been limited and slow to emerge, both before the August 
2017 attacks and afterwards. In seeking to help understand why international law and institutions 
have not been effective, the approach here is to adapt certain sociology of law frameworks into 
a lens through which to view and assess international responses as a legal process. Specifically, 
insights are drawn from Felstiner et al.’s framework to describe the emergence and transformation 
of legal disputes.81 As described in more detail below, this framework describes three stages – 
naming, blaming, and claiming – that constitute the progression of a legal dispute. Literature 
concerning models of legal protection, legal ambiguity, symbolic structures, and institutionalization 
of remedies also enhances the analysis. 
The intuition underlying this analytical approach is that if serious crimes such as crimes 
against humanity and genocide are invoked in a context where mass atrocities are reportedly 
72 Ibid., art. 8.
73 UNGA, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble.
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taking place or threaten to occur, then a legal process providing a remedy of some kind should 
follow. However, responses that appear to be weak or limited in turn frustrate the expectation 
of a generally linear legal process that leads to some sort of resolution or adjudication. Certain 
factors are obstructing the process or the model of legal dispute resolution in the international 
context may require some adjustment. Sociology of law theories such as Felstiner et al.’s can help 
to delineate the components of a legal process that resolve a legal dispute or bring about the legal 
change required by the applicable law in a particular context. Tracing whether and to what extent 
international responses to the Rohingya crisis track the stages of legal dispute resolution can help 
to clarify the points at which the international responses, or lack thereof, diverge from the legal 
model. Such an analysis can elucidate what might be obstructing remedies at what stage of the legal 
process. This information can in turn suggest where reform efforts should focus in order to improve 
international legal responsiveness to mass atrocities. Such information can also help to demonstrate 
how international legal processes can be distinct from domestic ones, prompting further reflection 
on whether international responses to mass atrocities should take on characteristics that are more 
or less law-like, or simply different, in order to be effective. 
To be sure, analyses of the relative effectiveness or ineffectiveness of international institutions 
in stopping or responding to mass atrocities in various cases have received significant scholarly 
attention. However, a substantial portion of the literature has focused on international criminal 
tribunals, their politics or technical aspects of international criminal legal doctrine.82  Similarly, 
sociological theories are largely adapted to analyzing the activities of international criminal 
tribunals, including the labeling of crimes such as genocide.83 These analyses are directly relevant 
to part of the analysis undertaken here, and they help to underscore the contribution sociology 
can make to international law and relations. For instance, Christensen points out how sociological 
studies of the International Criminal Court (ICC) can play a central role in “analyzing the social 
dynamics that structure its potential impact as an international institution that has been repeatedly 
criticized for its lack of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy.”84 Sociological studies similarly 
can help to analyze the social dynamics that frustrate efforts to respond to atrocities effectively and 
according to international normative commitments, under the ICC’s Rome Statute, the Genocide 
Convention, or other law or doctrine, such as the United Nations Charter or Responsibility to 
Protect. This paper expands on these efforts to adapt sociological theories to international law, but 
broadens the focus to analyze how law matters both within and beyond international tribunals as 
states and other actors perceive and confront their obligations to act in the face of mass atrocities. 
To grasp more fully why international responses have not been effective, the vision must consider 
the international legal system beyond international criminal justice. 
Accordingly, the analysis here turns to what Galanter has called “the most important conceptual 
tool in analyzing legal encounters and legal change—the dispute pyramid, which traces potential 
pathways from ‘perceived injurious experiences’ to remedies, via grievances, claims, disputes, and 
remedial institutions like lawyers and courts.”85 As Galanter asserts, “the urtext of this conceptual 
track” is the paper, Naming, Blaming, and Claiming by William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and 
Austin Sarat.86 Several studies have deployed this framework in domestic legal settings to identify 
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Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation (New 
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obstacles to effective legal responses and potential areas for reform.87 However, none appear to 
have adapted the dispute pyramid to the international context. 
In this work, Felstiner et al. identify three transformations that occur in the emergence of a 
dispute. The first is “naming,” or “saying to oneself that a particular experience is injurious.”88 
This transformation “may be the most critical,” according to the authors, as “the level and kind 
of disputing in a society may turn more on what is initially perceived as an injury than on any 
later decision.”89 The second transformation, “blaming,” occurs when a perceived injurious 
experience (PIE) is turned into a grievance. “This occurs when a person attributes an injury to 
the fault of another individual or social entity.”90 As they write, “the injured person must feel 
wronged and believe that something might be done in response to the injury, however politically 
or sociologically improbable such a response might be.”91 The third transformation is “claiming,” 
or “when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or entity believed to be responsible and 
asks for some remedy.”92 In the context of international law, claiming is better understood in the 
broad sense of taking action on a PIE or grievance through various (legally justifiable) measures 
that states, international institutions, and individuals may use to change behavior of or punish 
perpetrators. This point is explored further in the subsections below. 
Felstiner et al. observe, “PIEs, grievances, and disputes are subjective, unstable, reactive, 
complicated, and incomplete.”93 Perceptions of injury, interpretations of grievance, assignation 
of blame, and processes of claiming may change as a result of various factors. For instance, the 
number of parties may not be fixed, as “new information about and redefinition of conflict” can 
lead a party or officials to change views about appropriate adversaries or allies.94   The relationship 
between the parties, whether they are linked through work, residence, or politics, or whether they 
have a prior history of conflict, can shape their relative status and costs of disputing.95 As the 
authors observe, reactivity in early stages of dispute formation is evident in how “individuals 
define and redefine their perceptions of experience and the nature of their grievances in response to 
the communications, behavior, and expectations of a range of people, including opponents, agents, 
authority figures, companions, and intimates.”96 Characteristics such as class, education, and social 
networks can also influence the development of disputes.97 Additional factors and actors play a 
role or may evolve in the emergence and transformation of disputes, such as the identity of the 
parties and the scope of conflict, or the extent of relevant discourse about grievances and claims.98 
Other factors include choice of mechanisms, objectives sought, reference groups (audiences or 
sponsors), and representatives and officials (such as lawyers, social workers, government officials, 
and bureaucrats).99 The following subsections explore how these concepts and factors play out in 
the context of the Rohingya crisis and international law and responses.
87 Michael Orsini, “The Politics Of Naming, Blaming, and Claiming: HIV, Hepatitis C, and the Emergence of Blood 
Activism in Canada,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 35 (2002), 475; Carolyn Weithoff, “Naming, Blaming, and 
Claiming in Public Disputes: The 1998 Maine Referendum on Civil Rights Protection for Gay Men and Lesbians,” 
Journal of Homosexuality 44 (2003), 61.
88 Felstiner, et al, 635.
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Naming and Blaming: Different Legal Terms, Different Weights of Responsibility
Many of the challenges of naming, blaming, and claiming in the context of the Rohingya stem from 
the relevant laws’ ambiguous terms and modes of application. As Felstiner et al. mention, how the 
injury is perceived – or which word or words are used to identify it – “may be the most critical” to 
how the dispute takes shape.100 As discussed, most experts would concede that a reasonable prima 
facie case of crimes against humanity and at least risk of genocide can be established, if not genocide 
itself. The ambiguity or challenge in the case of naming crimes against humanity and especially 
genocide concern how much certainty of the crime’s likelihood or actual existence is required in order 
to apply the name and justify a response. An additional question is what kinds of responses are 
adequate to meet international legal obligations if the crimes likely or actually amount to crimes 
against humanity or genocide. 
Relatedly, another question is whether the distinction between crimes against humanity 
and genocide even really matters. Two understandings of crimes against humanity and genocide 
currently seem to coexist. The first, arguably progressive understanding is that since the UN 
General Assembly embraced the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005, the obligations to act on 
the part of states and the international community are the same whether the crimes concerned are 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, or genocide.101 This reflects the evolved 
view on the part of the international community that all of these crimes constitute “unimaginable 
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”102 As U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell 
said of the violence in Darfur, Sudan in 2005, whether or not the crime of genocide applied, U.S. 
policy toward Sudan would remain the same in terms of pressuring the Khartoum government 
to stop abuses and providing humanitarian relief; “applying the ‘genocide’ label would not 
require anything more from the United States.”103 The second, traditional understanding is that 
notwithstanding R2P, the notion of genocide continues to carry special meaning because of its 
intent requirement; the specific intent to destroy an ethnic or religious group, “as such,” and thus 
sits at the top of a hierarchy of grave crimes.104 As noted, this specific intent requirement imposes 
a high burden of proof, demanding that evidence be “fully conclusive.”105 This strict standard thus 
“renders genocide determinations unavoidably contestable.”106
In addition to the contestability of genocide determinations, R2P is at best an unsettled 
doctrine.107 As Chesterman points out, by the time the UN General Assembly endorsed R2P in 
2005, “its normative content had been emasculated to the point where it essentially provided that 
the Security Council could authorize, on a case-by-case basis, things that it had been authorizing 
for more than a decade.”108 It nonetheless had normative significance, in that while “the true 
significance of [R2P] is not in creating new rights or obligations to do ‘the right thing’; rather, it 
is in making it harder to do the wrong thing or nothing at all.”109 The terms regarding how the 
international community can fulfill its commitment to protect populations are open-ended. As 
provided in the Outcome Document, the international community, “through the United Nations,” 
is to “use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means.”  It is “prepared to take 
collective action... on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations 
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as appropriate.”110 In comparison, the 1948 Genocide Convention is a binding treaty with 146 States 
Parties. It is clearer than R2P with respect to obligations to act and more concrete steps to take, 
such as extraditing and trying alleged perpetrators in a competent tribunal, punishing offenders, 
and submitting disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).111 
The sense of hierarchy between the two terms of crimes against humanity and genocide 
feeds reluctance to act unless the term of genocide is applied. The genocide label heightens the 
scrutiny and thereby the pressure applied to parties obligated to act. Presumably Secretary Powell 
implicitly sensed this distinction when he, notwithstanding his remarks about the equivalence 
of crimes against humanity and genocide, eventually commissioned an inquiry into whether the 
events in Darfur constituted genocide.112 If genocide is therefore perceived to be a more serious 
crime, triggering greater expectation of action, states and other institutions may seek to avoid 
that label, depending on the interests they may have at stake. As a result, the crime is not named 
and crimes against humanity in turn inspire less urgency. The dispute thus has limited scope for 
transformation. 
In some respects, this scenario appears to be playing out in the case of the Rohingya. For 
a government or the UN to allege or name genocide or the risk of genocide would raise some 
expectation of some kind of punitive or coercive action against the Myanmar government. Such 
efforts could compromise the international community’s effort to incentivize further national 
reforms in Myanmar and expand business and other opportunities for all through reduced 
sanctions and increased investment and engagement. Having waited a half-century for the country 
to move out of isolation and embrace democracy and human rights, international actors may resist 
the idea of appearing to turn back the clock. Cognitive dissonance is also generated when human 
rights authority figures such as Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi decline to discuss persecution of 
the Rohingya, presumably out of concern for her own capacity to assert political influence towards 
other ostensibly good ends within the country. Moreover, the question of naming has been taken 
to an extreme with government officials requesting that the term “Rohingya” not even be used.113 
This signals to the Rohingya and the international community that they too risk backlash if they 
discuss the plight of the community, let alone label it genocide. Only since late 2017, when the scale 
of violence and displacement had reached a mysterious threshold of egregiousness, could officials 
no longer avoid the term genocide.
Another dynamic that complicates the naming process in the Rohingya case is the diffusion 
of authority in naming the crime so as to compel or credibly pressure action. Perhaps the most 
authoritative source absent adjudication by the ICC or ICJ would be the United Nations. Up until 
late 2017, UN officials had described the plight of the Rohingya as a “profound crisis,” which 
“has the potential to undermine the entire reform process in Myanmar.”114 In September 2017, a 
UN official characterized the Rohingya crisis as ethnic cleansing, but none until December 2017 
officially linked the situation with genocide. The Special Representative on Genocide Prevention 
has on a couple of occasions identified the risk of genocide, but averred that only a court could 
make a genocide determination. The fact-finding mission established by the Human Rights Council 
assuredly found in August 2018 that genocidal intent on the part of Myanmar authorities could 
reasonably be inferred based on the circumstances of the Rohingya case. Yet it went on to defer 
to a judicial process to investigate and prosecute senior officials “so that a competent court can 
110 UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 139.
111 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, articles 4-9. 
112 U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, “The Crisis in Darfur,” (testimony, Washington, DC, September 9, 2004), Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, accessed November 19, 2018, https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/
remarks/36042.htm. 
113 Todd Pitman and Julie Pace, “Obama Says ‘Rohingya,’ Displeasing Myanmar Hosts,” ABCNews, November 14, 2014, 
accessed November 19, 2018, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/group-obama-rohingya-myanmar-
visit-26904145. 
114 Tomás Ojéa Quintana, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, United Nations 
Human Rights Council, March 6, 2013 (UN Doc. A/HRC/22/58), para. 46, accessed November 19, 2018, http://www.
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determine their liability for genocide in relation to the situation in Rakhine State.”115 Similarly, 
back in 2015, while Yale Law School’s human rights clinic found “strong evidence that the abuses 
against the Rohingya satisfy the [] elements of genocide,” it went on to call upon the United Nations 
to establish an independent commission of inquiry on the human rights situation in Rakhine State 
and whether the crime of genocide is applicable.116 These statements leave the impression that 
courts or other authoritative bodies largely make definitive genocide determinations, typically 
reached, if at all, years after the events have taken place. In the mean time, this deferral of authority 
on whether or not a situation amounts to or could amount to genocide can confuse understanding 
of appropriate responses, be they preventive or protective after the fact. Somewhat distinctively 
and as noted above, the November 2017 report by Fortify Rights and the Simon Skojt Center at the 
U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum was clear that the international community “should not wait for 
a formal legal determination of genocide to take immediate action.”117
In line with that latter approach, in terms of obtaining some sort of action, states themselves 
either need to broaden their openness to considering the application of genocide, at least acting 
in the interest of preventing or reducing the risk of genocide, or accept a responsibility to act as 
robustly if the crimes are deemed best described as crimes against humanity. 
In addition to deferring to courts or official commissions to make definitive determinations, 
diffusion of authority in naming also manifests in terms of the various actors who precede official 
institutions in labeling atrocity crimes. From 2011 to 2018, scholars, activists, and organizations 
have increasingly brought up the term of genocide, sometimes in terms of describing a risk of 
genocide, though some could reasonably argue that a “slow-burning” genocide has been under 
way for years.118 It therefore seems in this situation that the process of naming crimes is an uneven 
consensus-building one that originates from civil society, academia, and the media and eventually 
penetrates (or not) the legal departments of official institutions. This view is consistent with 
Prunier’s characterization of atrocities in Darfur, Sudan as “the ambiguous genocide,” due to the 
diverse positions on the question taken by the United States, the United Nations, the European 
Union, and human rights organizations.119 These indefinite dynamics concerning which terms to 
use to name injuries, and who has the authority to apply names, are consistent with Felstiner et 
al.’s observation about the instability, complexity, and incompleteness of disputes. However, in 
the international system, this instability is magnified, as no central body is consistently invoked 
to pronounce in a timely way on whether a crime is appropriately labeled one thing or another. 
Additionally, preventive norms allowing or mandating action in the absence of legal certainty 
remain nebulous. Accordingly, naming and blaming become more difficult. 
Claiming: Constrained Models of Legal Protection
Problems of ambiguity, vagueness, and diffusion of authority and responsibility also apply in the 
processes of claiming rights and protection for the Rohingya. As noted above, “claiming” in Felstiner 
et al.’s framework is “when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or entity believed 
to be responsible and asks for some remedy.”120 In the context of international law, particularly 
atrocity law, claiming is better understood in the broad sense of taking action on a PIE or grievance 
through legally justifiable measures that states, international institutions, and individuals may use 
to change behavior or punish perpetrators. The applicable legal authorities of R2P, the Genocide 
Convention, and the ICC’s Rome Statute assign the roles of naming, blaming, and claiming to 
additional actors beyond the victims. These include states themselves, regional organizations such 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the UN Security Council, UN special 
mechanisms such as Special Rapporteurs, and the ICC Prosecutor, among others. Civil society 
115 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the international fact-finding mission on Myanmar, para. 87.
116 Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims. 
117 Ibid.
118 Zarni and Cowley, The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya.
119 John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 31, 34.
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groups also take on these roles on behalf of victims, implicitly acknowledging that victims under 
conditions comparable to crimes against humanity or genocide may be so suppressed or threatened 
that advocacy on their own behalf is severely constrained. This variety of actors, and the range of 
measures they might consider to assert claims or seek enforcement, would seem to amplify but also 
complicate the possibility of dispute emergence and transformation (and consequent resolution) 
for the Rohingya. 
Bumiller’s notion of the “model of legal protection,” Edelman’s concepts of “legal ambiguity 
and symbolic structures,” and Miller and Sarat’s observations on the institutionalization of 
remedies are helpful in elucidating some of the claiming challenges. They also help to suggest 
differences in the operation of international versus domestic law. 
Bumiller observes that discrimination laws and policies – of which genocide and crimes 
against humanity such as persecution can be said to constitute a version – are based on a model of 
legal protection, “which assumes that those who have suffered harms will recognize their injuries 
and invoke the protective measures of the law.”121 She adds that, “these laws tacitly assume that 
such behavior is reasonably unproblematic.”122 However, in Bumiller’s study of the effectiveness 
of antidiscrimination laws in the United States, she found that the success of these laws were 
frustrated by what she termed an “ethic of survival,” whereby alleged victims did not pursue 
claims for various reasons related to self-preservation and avoidance of potentially exacerbated 
problems. For instance, they feared retaliation from employers in the form of job loss or increased 
hostility or humiliation. They were deterred by the financial and emotional costs of disputing, 
among other factors.123  
R2P, the Genocide Convention, and the Rome Statute attach to the crimes they cover a sense 
of egregiousness and outrage, suggesting that such crimes are and will be easily identified and 
acted upon, tacitly implying, per Bumiller, that the appropriate response is unproblematic. Yet 
as noted, unlike the domestic discrimination laws in Bumiller’s study, these laws do not solely or 
explicitly place the burden of recognition of injury and initiation of action (naming and claiming) 
on the victims. The burden of naming and claiming is shared with the international community, 
states, international institutions, and implicitly civil society. Under these legal frameworks, the 
states within which the crimes are occurring have the first responsibility to protect. However, 
when the states are themselves implicated in the crimes, responsibility for action diffuses within 
the international community, leading to a situation where others wait for others to act, displaying 
a kind of “ethic of survival” whereby states and institutions such as the UN or ICC do not act 
because they individually do not wish to risk compromising whatever interests or perception of 
credibility they may have in the situation. These other interests may include other humanitarian 
concerns in the country, an emotional or political investment in Myanmar’s eventual democratic 
transition, business or regional security interests, fear of some sort of backlash that could damage 
credibility or operations, or other global crises demanding resources and attention. 
In avoiding the process of claiming, international actors draw upon legal ambiguity to erect 
institutions, or what Edelman calls “symbolic structures,” that lack inherent enforcement capacity. 
As Edelman explains
The opportunity for organizations to mediate law is variable. Laws that contain vague 
or controversial language, laws that regulate organizational procedures more than the 
substantive results of those procedures, and laws that provide weak enforcement mechanisms 
leave more room for organizational mediation than laws that are more specific, substantive, 
and backed by strong enforcement.124  
121 Kristin Bumiller, “Victims in the Shadow of the Law: A Critique of the Model of Legal Protection,” Signs 12, no. 3 
(Spring 1987), 422.
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She goes on to state that laws with “broad and ambiguous principles” can afford organizations 
“wide latitude to construct the meaning of compliance.”125
In the case of the Rohingya, various institutions exist whose mandates would cover the abuses 
the minority faces, but various factors mediate the effectiveness of enforcement. While the UN 
Security Council has held briefings and even traveled to the region in April 2018,126 Russia and 
China are widely expected to veto sanctions or other coercive steps against Myanmar that other 
Security Council members might seek to apply under the UN Charter.127 
The UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has a mandate to provide early warning 
and build international capacity to respond to genocide. However, his office has issued few 
statements on the Rohingya and whether any other diplomatic steps up until this latest round of 
violence have been taken to promote action is unclear. His capacity to promote effective responses 
depends in part on the political will of states to engage, and so limited action may therefore reflect 
a lack of political will or the absence of “normative pressure from [his] environment to elaborate 
formal structures to create visible symbols of [his] attention to law.”128 Somewhat insulated from 
external scrutiny, this office is difficult to evaluate. As Edelman notes, “most organizations’ 
construction of compliance is never examined in court. Thus organizations’ collective response to 
law becomes the de facto construction of compliance; it is shaped only at the margins by formal 
legal institutions.”129 
Special Rapporteurs for Human Rights have served a role in documenting abuses and 
legitimizing efforts to name crimes, at least as crimes against humanity, and pursue claims. But 
these roles too are shaped by the initiative or lack thereof of their occupants. In 2014, Special 
Rapporteur Yanghee Lee took the opportunity to counter efforts to suppress the term, “Rohingya,” 
stating that
I was repeatedly told not to use the term ‘Rohingya’ as this was not recognized by the 
Government. Yet, as a human rights independent expert, I am guided by international human 
rights law . . . the rights of minorities to self-identify on the basis of their national, ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic characteristics is related to the obligations of States to ensure non-
discrimination against individuals and groups, which is a central principle of international 
human rights law.130
In March 2018, before the fact-finding mission had released its report, she stated to the UN 
Human Rights Council, “I am becoming more convinced that the crimes committed following 9 
October 2016 and 25 August 2017 bear the hallmarks of genocide, and call in the strongest terms 
for accountability.”131 Because the Rapporteur is directly engaged in Myanmar, perhaps she feels 
greater normative pressure to take steps demonstrating compliance with the mandate of her 
position. These statements also reflect the potential of rights to serve as a “cultural or symbolic 
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resource” in promoting social change.132 As Albiston points out, “mobilizing rights, even in informal 
contexts, can . . . delegitimize conduct previously accepted as natural or normal.”133  
Another institution with a relevant mandate is the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission 
on Human Rights (AICHR). While one of its purposes is to promote and protect human rights 
in the ASEAN region, realization of rights is mediated and constrained by the fact that it has no 
formal complaint mechanism and by principles of non-confrontation and consensus among its 
members.134 Individual government responses are mediated by the complexity of formulating and 
implementing foreign policy. In the U.S. Government, for instance, the process of pursuing claims 
for the Rohingya involves coordination among multiple agencies within the U.S. State Department, 
National Security Council, and U.S. Congress. 
With respect to international tribunals, Becker finds that while the International Court 
of Justice would have jurisdiction over a dispute regarding Myanmar’s compliance with the 
Genocide Convention, persuading a non-injured state to bring such a case would be politically 
difficult.135 The International Criminal Court (ICC), while empowered to bring justice to victims, 
remains constrained. The ICC and other international tribunals depend on the cooperation of 
states, including cooperation from states under investigation for criminal behavior.136 As Peskin 
has documented, despite wide ratification of the Rome Statute, lack of political support hampers 
state cooperation with the ICC.137 Accordingly, the distinction that Alter et al. draw between the 
legal competence and actual, de facto authority of international institutions plays out with respect 
to international legal responses more broadly.138
Together, the obstacles to naming, blaming, and claiming in the context of the Rohingya 
crisis suggest limited institutionalization of remedies. As Miller and Sarat have observed, “Higher 
levels of institutionalization . . . would be associated with higher rates of grievance perception and 
claiming . . . and higher rates of success in recovery for meritorious claims.”139  Institutionalization 
of remedies is denoted by “well-known, regularized, readily available mechanisms, techniques, or 
procedures for dealing with a problem.”140 In the case of atrocity prevention and cessation, as in the 
case of the Rohingya, remedies are not regularized or readily apparent, but are highly dependent 
on the balance of and interaction of interests among states and the international community. 
This makes for ad hoc, case-by-case, and overly slow approaches to allegations of crimes against 
humanity and genocide, addressed by institutions with limited enforcement capacity. 
 
Conclusion
The challenges in naming, blaming, and claiming rights and protection for the Rohingya largely 
arise from the ambiguity in relevant laws concerning mass atrocity, the diffusion of authority 
and responsibility that occurs in those laws’ application, and the relative lack of enforcement 
capacity of institutions, such as the UN, ICJ, and ICC, squarely tasked with protecting against 
or prosecuting grave crimes such as crimes against humanity and genocide. The international 
system is a clear example of Miller and Sarat’s point that, “It is easier, on the whole, for societies 
to declare rights than to provide remedies; indeed, the development of remedies almost inevitably 
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133 Ibid.
134 ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, Terms of Reference (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), 
articles 1, 4.
135 Michael A. Becker, “Is There a Role for the International Court of Justice?” EJIL: Talk!, November 14, 2018, accessed 
November 18, 2018, https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-situation-of-the-rohingya-is-there-a-role-for-the-international-court-
of-justice/. 
136 Under Article 12, Myanmar may accept the jurisdiction of the court on an ad hoc basis, an unlikely possibility. 
137 Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans, 251. 
138 Karen J. Alter, et al, “How Contexts Shape the Authority of International Courts,” Law and Contemporary Problems 79 
(2016), 1.
139 Richard E. Miller and Austin Sarat, “Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture,” Law and 
Society Review 15, no. 3/4 (1981), 564.
140 Ibid., 563.
Southwick
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1572
136
lags behind the recognition of rights.”141 Seventy years since the adoption of the UN Genocide 
Convention, however, seems like an unusually long lag for effective remedies to develop. Yet the 
situation of the Rohingya illustrates some of the unique features of and constraints on international 
law. The processes of naming and claiming rights is more diffuse, and thus generally renders 
the emergence and transformation of disputes on behalf of victims more unstable, complex, and 
arduous than in domestic settings. Courts such as the ICC and ICJ may or may not play a role, and 
non-judicial responses, mediated by competing interests of actors obligated to act, arguably operate 
less in the shadow of courts than they do in domestic legal settings. Legal concepts and structures 
become more dependent upon, embedded in, and transfigured by political and social dynamics, 
amidst negotiations among and between states and private actors, at international and local levels. 
International human rights law is therefore less legal in nature and more social and political. 
Felstiner et al. aver that “a healthy social order is one that minimizes barriers inhibiting the 
emergence of grievances and disputes and preventing their translation into claims for redress.”142 
By this measure, the barriers to remedies the Rohingya have faced for over thirty years would 
signal that the international human rights order is unhealthy. It remains for further research to 
identify the specific reforms needed to remedy these weaknesses, but the dispute pyramid helps to 
identify areas for consideration, specifically the development of streamlined processes for naming 
crimes and clarification of roles and responsibilities for states and international institutions to act 
preventively and decisively in the absence of legal certainty. Such an approach would in a sense flip 
the dispute pyramid to allow for claiming to precede definitive naming, moving toward a model 
of crime prevention rather than legal dispute transformation. As the UN has stated, “prevention 
is the first imperative of justice.”143 Prevention is explicitly the point of “Never Again.”144 More 
broadly, the application of Felstiner et al.’s legal lens to the Rohingya crisis helps to uncover a 
paradox about law in the international context, where law is both peripheral and central. Law 
is peripheral because social and political dynamics obstruct and overwhelm its operation. At the 
same time, law is central as it enshrines a moral, animating value that compels imagining more 
effective institutions and enforcement procedures, whether they are increasingly law-like or not. 
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